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This Article examines four such strategies, those employed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Chile. Part I of this Article examines the experience of military dictatorship in each of these
countries and the respective efforts each country has made to bring torturers to accountability. Part
II offers a comparison of such strategies and the judicial philosophies that informed them. Finally,
Part III, explores a distinctly Catholic perspective from which such strategies might be assessed,
the fundamental notion of sacramentality, and implications for such an assessment.
RESCUING HISTORY: LEGAL AND
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
TASK OF MAKING FORMER
TORTURERS ACCOUNTABLE
Terence S. Coonan*
Everything happened very quickly. From the moment they
took me out of the car to the beginning of the first electric
shock session took less time than I am taking to tell it. For
days they applied electric shocks to my gums, nipples, geni-
tals, abdomen, and ears.... [A]lthough the shocks made me
scream, jerk, and shudder, they could not make me pass
out.... At first the pain was dreadful. Then it became un-
bearable.... The normal attitude of the torturers and guards
toward us was to consider us less than slaves. We were objects.
And useless, troublesome objects at that. They would say:
"You're dirt. Since we 'disappeared' you, you're nothing.
Anyway, nobody remembers you. You don't exist.... We are
everything for you. We are justice. We are God."1
INTRODUCTION
Journalist Lawrence Weschlere has noted that the institution
of torture functions at two levels. It seeks to break down not
only individuals, but also the societies in which they live.3 The
ultimate message of the torturer to his victim is often made ex-
* Law Firm ofJoseph De Mott, San Antonio, Texas; J.D., University of Cincinnati
School of Law, recipient of an Urban Morgan Human Rights Fellowship. Mr. Coonan
served with the Vicariate of Solidarity in Santiago, Chile during the 1980s, and subse-
quently worked in conjunction with non-governmental human rights groups in Brazil,
Uruguay, and Argentina. His current practice is concentrated on refugee and interna-
tional human rights law issues.
1. NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE Dis-
APPEARED 22-25 (Writers and Scholars International trans., 1986) [hereinafter NUNCA
MAs ARGENTINA] (quoting Dr. Norberto Liwsky, torture survivor in Argentina).
2. Weschler has written extensively concerning torture and its effects upon individ-
uals and societies where it is practiced. He has detailed the story of how torture became
institutionalized in Brazil and Uruguay in the 1970s and how both societies have con-
fronted or failed to confront this national horror. See generally LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A
MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING AccouNTs WITH TORTURERS (1990).
3. See Lawrence Weschler, Introduction to SERVICIO PAZ YJUST1CIA-URUGUAY, URU-
GUAY NUNCA MAs: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, 1972-1985 xvi-xvii (Elizabeth Hampsten
trans., 1992).
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plicit during the act of torture itself: "Scream all you like, no
one will ever hear you." Such a message makes two assertions of
impunity. Most immediately, the torturer implies that his victim
is utterly powerless and isolated. The second assertion is implicit
as well, that civil society itself is likewise powerless and will never
be capable of making the torturer accountable for his acts of
savagery.4
Following the departure of regimes in which torture has
been institutionalized, both individual torture victims and the
body politic of the societies affected need healing. For individu-
als who have suffered torture, the road to healing is often one of
physical and emotional therapy, constructed around the neces-
sity of revisiting the painful memories of such acts of personal
violation. 5 So too with societies at large. Their own rehabilita-
tion is possible only to the extent that they are willing to revisit
their past and acknowledge the existence of such abuses.
In Latin America, this acknowledgment has rarely been
completely forthcoming when democratic rule has been re-
stored following a military dictatorship. In Argentina and nu-
merous other Southern Cone countries, the stories of Dr.
Norberto Liwsky and thousands of other torture victims have
been eclipsed by amnesties, pardons, and concessions made by
fragile civilian governments to unreconstructed militaries.6
4. Investigators in the unofficial truth commission in Uruguay have written:
[T]orture has a purpose beyond its effect on the immediate victim, and that is
to intimidate society at large. Punishing a single victim can dissuade others;
the victim is made a martyr for the wider repercussions that his savage treat-
ment can realize. Torturers assume that, confronted with the prospect of tor-
tore, an entire society can be paralyzed by the terror, and thus resistance
movements to a dictatorship can be made to disappear. In such instances,
torture is not directed at the body of the prisoner alone, but at the social body.
Torture is transformed from the method to make a few talk, to a silencer of
everyone.... For such a strategy to succeed, it obviously is necessary that
torture is known to be practiced, that there is no doubt as to the treatment
prisoners will receive or the immunity that torturers will enjoy.
SERVICIO PAZ v JUSTICIA-URUGUAY, URUGUAY NUNCA MAs: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
1972-1985 84 (Elizabeth Hampsten trans., 1992) [hereinafter NUNCA MA URUGUAY].
5. See generally GLENN R. RANDALL & ELLEN L. LUTZ, SERVING SURVIVORS OF TOR-
TURE (1992).
6. The amnesties granted to the human rights offenders of previous military re-
gimes have generated a plethora of legal commentaries. See generay MARGARET POPRIN
& NAOMI RoHT-ARRAzA, 1 TRANSrrIONALJUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES 262-89 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1996); Tom Farer, Consolidating Democ-
racy in Latin America: Law, Legal Institutions, and Constitutional Structure, 10 Am. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295, 1304-10 (1995); Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace:
u_ _
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A certain conventional wisdom has emerged that insists that
these concessions are inevitable and even ultimately beneficial
for countries returning to democracy. Uruguayan President Ju-
lio Maria Sanguinetti argues, "[n]ations... are constructed on
the basis of great rememberings and great forgettings."7 Events
of recent years, however, belie the assertion that democracy in
Latin America has been consolidated by "great forgettings."8 In
1995, Argentina was rocked by the confessions of a retired naval
officer who admitted to sedating political prisoners and then
throwing them from airplanes into the South Atlantic during the
Dirty War, an unofficial effort by the government to eliminate
civilians considered dangerous to the regime.9 In Chile, the re-
Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1996);
Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human
Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857, 866-75 (1995).
7. See WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 191 (citing Sanguinetti's quotation of nineteenth
century French historian Ernest Renan).
8. See Carlos -Castilho, Latin America: The Open Wound of the Disappeared, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, May 18, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (making
new revelations of past torture by former military regimes in Brazil and Uruguay);
Daniel Gatti, Latin America-Human Rights: Still Pending After All These Years, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Jan. 2, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (stating that after
two decades, wounds inflicted by military dictatorship in Argentina remain unhealed);
Tim Johnson, Ghosts of 'Dirty Wars'Still Haunt, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 10, 1995, at D10; How-
ard LaFranchi, Cleanup of 'Dirty Little Wars'Demanded in Latin American Countries, CHRIS-
TAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1995, at 10 (discussing split among Latin American coun-
tries over how best to heal past wounds); Todd Lewan, Relatives of Victims of 'Dirty Wars'
Demand Full Accounting, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 10, 1996, at A13 (discussing renewed debate
about Dirty Wars); William R. Long, Dirty War' Debate Refuses to Die, L.A. TIMES, July 25,
1995, at 1; Matt Miller & Arthur Golden, Confronting the Brutal Past, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TIaB., Dec. 17, 1995, at Al; The Past Raises Its Ugly Head, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 31.
9. See Calvin Sims, Argentine Tells of Dumping 'Dirty War' Captives into Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1995, at Al. A national outcry followed this revelation, igniting public protests
and a renewed debate concerning impunity for human rights offenders. See Calvin
Sims, National Nightmare Returns to Argentine Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at
Al; see also Argentina: Dirty War Will Not Go Away as New Details Emerge of Disappearances &
Torture, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. Ar., Mar. 31, 1995. In a further development unprece-
dented in Latin America, the army chief of staff publicly admitted that the Argentine
military had tortured and killed political opponents during the dictatorship. Associated
Press, Argentine General Says Army Killed Leftists in 'Dirty War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1995, at
19. The controversy these admissions engendered quickly engulfed President Carlos
Menem, the military, and the Catholic hierarchy in Argentina. See, e.g., Stephen Brown,
Mothers Remember, Argentinians Won't Forgive or Forget, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 1996,
at B5; Pamela Constable, Revisiting the Horrors of Their Past, WASH. POST, May 22, 1995, at
BI; Gabriella Gamini, Military Urged to Reveal Graves of Tortured, THE TIMES (London),
May 11, 1995; William R. Long, 'Dirty War' Confessions Revive Argentines' Suffering, L.A.
TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 1; Marcela Valente, Argentina-Human Rights: Scandal Over
Church's Role Heats Up, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 11, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
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fusal of the military to hand over two high-ranking officers con-
victed of planning the 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier ° set off
a constitutional crisis and revealed how deeply unsettled the
country remains in the wake of the Pinochet dictatorship."' Pub-
lic protests also erupted in Uruguay, an indication that accom-
modation with the former military regime there likewise has
failed to produce any sense of national reconciliation.'
2
Although many of the atrocities in Latin America's Dirty Wars
were perpetrated almost two decades ago, they have left wounds
that have neither healed nor, in many instances, even been ac-
knowledged by their respective societies.
Reinstituted Latin American democracies opted for a variety
of strategies for dealing with former torture regimes. This Arti-
cle examines four such strategies, those employed by Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. Part I of this Article examines the
experience of military dictatorship in each of these countries
and the respective efforts each country has made to bring tortur-
ers to accountability. Part II offers a comparison of such strate-
gies and the judicial philosophies that informed them. Finally,
Part III, explores a distinctly Catholic perspective from which
such strategies might be assessed, the fundamental notion of
sacramentality, and implications for such an assessment.
Allnewsplus Database; Marcela Valente, Argentina-Human Rights: Murder of French Nuns
Dogs Menem, I TER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus
Database; Marcela Valente, Argentina: Pressure Builds for Action On the Disappeared; INTER
PRESS SERVICE, May 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
10. Orlando Letelier was the Chilean ambassador to the United States when he
and his assistant were killed. John Kavanagh, President Is Focus for Chileans SeekingJustice,
IRISH TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1995, at 8. Their deaths in 1976 were the result of a car bomb.
John Otis, Chilean General's Imprisonment for Political Killing Called Mockery, DALLAS MoRN-
INC NEWS, Dec. 21, 1996, at 11A.
11. See Gabriel Escobar, Case of Jail-Bound General Shatters Chile's Composure, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 21, 1995, at A22; Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile: Massive Event Organized By Relatives
of 'Disappeared', INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus
Database; Susan Jackson, In Chile, Pinochet Stands in the Path of Reconciliation, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 19, 1995, at A8; William R. Long, First Argentina, Now Chile: A Nation Looks
Back in Anger, LA TiMES, June 3, 1995, at 2; Lake Sagaris, Chile Still Grapples with 1970s
Dirty Little War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1995, at 8.
12. See Ratil Ronzoni, Argentina-Uruguay: Fall.out of Dirty War Spreads, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, May 17, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database; Ratil Ronzoni,
Human Rights: Self-Criticism of Argentine Army Shakes Uruguay, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr.
28, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database; Silent Marchers Revive Abuses by
Past Military Dictatorship, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 21, 1996.
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I. TORTURE REGIMES iN LATIN AMERICA
A. Argentina
From 1976 until 1983, Argentina endured one of the most
brutal dictatorships in Latin American history.1 3 Soon after seiz-
ing power, the military embarked upon a Dirty War in which the
enemy included not only persons espousing leftist subversion,
but anyone suspected of opposing the military regime, including
priests, union workers, teachers, lawyers, psychologists, journal-
ists, and students.1 4 In the months that followed the coup, the
tactic that would become the hallmark of the Dirty War, forced
disappearances, was introduced in Argentina. 5
The decision to subject political adversaries to forced disap-
pearances was not endemic to Argentina,16 nor was Argentina
13. NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at xii. The 1976 coup was the sixth such
military intervention in less than 50 years. Military leaders previously had wrested
power from civilian governments in Argentina in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, and 1966. See
AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTLALJUSTICE IN ARGENTINA 4 (1987) [hereinafter PAR-
TIAL JUSTICE].
14. See NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv. The military were very
explicit about the nature of the Dirty War that they were fighting. Several months after
the coup, General Vilas of the Fifth Army Corps declared, "[u]p to now, only the tip of
the iceberg has been affected by our war against subversion .... It is necessary to
destroy the sources which feed, form and indoctrinate the subversive delinquent, and
this source is the university and the secondary schools themselves." JOHN SIMPSON &
JANA BENNET, THE DISAPPEARED AND THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA 209 (1985). General
Videla himself asserted, "[a] terrorist is not only that for killing with a weapon or plac-
ing a bomb, but also for encouraging other persons, through ideas that are contrary to
our Western and Christian civilization." PARTIALJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 6-7.
15. A "disappearance" is the covert abduction, torture, and killing of a citizen by a
government. See Chip Pitts & David Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights in 1992, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 122, 127 (1992) (quoting from
U.N. Draft Declaration on Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances).
The Argentine Truth Commission, also referred to as the Sfbato Commission, after its
principal appointee, author Ernesto Sibato, reflected upon the evolution of disappear-
ances in the early months of the Argentine military regime:
Watchful Argentines soon discovered what a dirty war was.
People-mainly but not only young people-began to disappear in great
numbers. They were swept off the street, or from their homes in the middle of
the night, by squads in plain clothes, and bundled into the trunks of the Ford
Falcons with no license plates these squads drove. Most were never seen again.
When desperate parents or friends sought information from the police or the
military, they were told authorities had no knowledge of who had taken the
victim or where he or she was. Some relatives hired lawyers to bring actions of
habeas corpus in the courts. But almost all these actions were dismissed.., and
the lawyers who brought the actions began to disappear themselves.
NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, xiii-xiv.
16. Hider had introduced this technique in Nazi Germany through his "Night and
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the first country to utilize such tactics in the Western hemi-
sphere.1 What made Argentina's Dirty War unprecedented in
Latin America was that such tactics rose to the level of official
state policy. For the first time in the Western Hemisphere, the
entire resources of a nation were given over to systematic torture
and murder.' 8 The effect was a calculated one. The Argentine
populace was put on notice that the very institutions committed
to maintaining the law were in fact intent upon subverting it.19
Between 1976 and 1983 thousands of people disappeared. °
The Dirty War began as a military campaign to eradicate left-
wing subversion, a campaign in which repression was utilized in
the service of ideology.2 1 Such repression quickly became the
ideology, however, and the torture and killing became more ca-
Fog" policy, disappearing political opponents, with no government acknowledgment
regarding the whereabouts or fate of the victims. SeeJAcoBo TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITH-
OUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER 50 (Toby Talbot trans., 1981).
17. The tactic had been introduced first in Guatemala and Brazil in the 1960s and
used again with savage effectiveness by Pinochet in the 1973 Chilean coup. See AIN
GUEST, BEHIND THE DIsAPPEARANcEs 32 (1990).
18. Id. "The Junta turned disappearances into a government policy and in so do-
ing gave new meaning to the concept of state terror. It was as deliberate, methodical,
and calculated as collecting tax[es], and as such very much out of character with the
haphazard brutality of previous military regimes." Id.
19. See id. at 25-27; see also NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at 386-427.
20. The exact number of those "disappeared" has never been ascertained. The
Sfbato Commission officially identified almost 9000 victims. NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA,
supra note 1, at 5. Americas Watch and Amnesty International have cited figures be-
tween 12,000 and 15,000. David Weissbrodt & Paul Fraser, Book Review, 14 HUM. RTS.
Q. 601, 605 n.16 (1992) (REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION). Nongovernmental organizations in Argentina such as the
Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo, Servicio de Paz yJusticia, and Emilio Mignone's Center
for Legal and Social Studies have given estimates as high as 30,000. Id.
21. Jos6 Zalaquett, a human rights lawyer exiled from Chile who would later serve
as an architect for the Chilean truth commission, summarized the national security
doctrine that comprised the ideology of the Argentine military:
In its essentials, the national security doctrine regards domestic political strug-
gles as an expression of a basic East-West conflict and sees Marxist penetration
and insurgency as an all-pervading presence of a new type of enemy fighting a
new type of war. Civilians are also warriors, ideas a different form of weapon.
Democracy and politics-as-usual cannot lead the fight against Marxism (in-
deed they often pave its way). Neither can they effectively coordinate all na-
tional resources to achieve modernization and economic development, pillars
of a modern notion of national security. This can only be done by the profes-
sionals of national security - the military. Since the war on Marxism is an insid-
ious one, unorthodox methods are called for, including torture and extermi-
nation of irredeemable political activists.
Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Prin-
ciples Applicable and Political Constraints, in THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISH-
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pricious and indiscriminate.2 2  Perhaps the greatest horror of
the Dirty War was that so many of its victims were completely
innocent, with no connections to the guerrilla movement.
23
The military eradicated the guerrilla movement by 1980,
but the terror of the Dirty War continued unabated.2 ' Argen-
tina's central problem then became one of its own making; the
military had created for itself a world that acknowledged no re-
straints or moral boundaries.25 Through its own corruption and
mismanagement, the junta 6 ultimately proved incapable of de-
livering the economic miracle it had promised.27 Eager to dis-
tract public attention from the country's economic woes, the
military, in April 1982, invaded the Falkland/Malvinas Islands,
territory long disputed with Great Britain. 8 More accustomed
to covert torture than to open combat, the Argentine armed
forces suffered a stinging defeat at the hands of Great Britain.'
In the wake of this humiliation, the military Government was
forced to resign.3 0
When Ra6l Alfonsin was elected president in October 1983,
he faced the daunting task of restoring democracy and the rule
MENT OR PARDON 23, 49-50 (1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES]; see SIMPSON & BENNET,
supra note 14, at 52-55 (describing Argentine military's internalization of this ideology).
22. While torture ostensibly had been introduced to elicit information from sus-
pected subversives, it eventually became an obsession for the torturers themselves. SIMP-
SON & BENNET, supra note 14, at 110. Some victims were pulled off the streets and
tortured because they were wealthy. Id. A number of women were kidnapped, tor-
tured, and raped, simply because guards found them sexually attractive. Id. at 109.
23. GUEST, supra note 17, at 31.
24. PARTIALJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 6.
25. NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at xvii. One commentator noted:
The original point of the "dirty war" - to create a climate of fear in which
subversion would be impossible - was superseded, for the officers who actually
carried it out, by an even more repellent purpose: the perverse exhilaration of
absolute, uncontrolled dominion over others, which became an end in itself, a
way of life. Nothing can seem out of bounds in a room where people are
deliberately made to suffer excruciating pain.
Id.
26. Ajunta is a "group of persons controlling a government especially after a revo-
lutionary seizure of power." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcrIONAV 655 (9th ed.
1991).
27. See SIMPSON & BENNET, supra note 14, at 187-207.
28. See GUEST, supra note 17, at 335-39.
29. Id.
30. Id. Following the humiliation of the Falklands/Malvinas defeat, General Leo-
poldo Galtieri, then the head of the junta, resigned in disgrace. STATE CRIMES, supra
note 21, at 50. General Reynaldo Bignone was appointed President on June 22, 1982.
Id. He implemented an eighteen month transition back to civilian rule. Id.
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of law in Argentina.3 1  Three days after assuming office, he or-
dered the trial of the nine generals who had headed Argentina's
three military juntas from 1976 to 1983.32 In so doing, Argen-
tina became the first Latin American country to try its own mili-
tary officers for human rights crimes.13 The junta members were
not charged with genocide or crimes against humanity, crimes
charged at the Nuremberg trials, but rather with violations of
domestic Argentine law, such as torture and unlawful depriva-
tion of liberty. 4  Ultimately, two commanders received
sentences of life imprisonment and two others received lesser
prison sentences.3 5
In an act that would perhaps comprise an even more impor-
tant precedent than the trials of the junta leaders, Alfonsin es-
tablished a special commission to investigate the disappearances
of the Dirty War.36 Entitled La Comisi6n Nacional sobre la Desapari-
31. Alfonsin conceptualized his task as an even more basic one of restoring a sense
of public morality to Argentine society. See Ratil Alfonsin, Building Democracy, 12 YALEJ.
INT'L L. 121, 123 (1987). Alfonsin was later to write:
The process of transition to democracy... was basically a response to a state of
social disintegration in which the fundamental links necessary for cooperation
and solidarity among individuals had been destroyed. For years the country
endured a state of generalized violence in which Argentines lost the set of
guidelines that constitute public ethics, legality, and even primary social rela-
tions. This loss generated fear, uncertainty, self-criticism, and, above all, inse-
curity stemming from the impossibility of predicting the arbitrary exercise of
public authority. One result was a general and self-defensive withdrawal; peo-
ple sought shelter in the private realm, abandoning all interest in public af-
fairs.... [N] either democracy nor the rule of law can be definitively secured
in a society if that society does not strongly internalize norms of public moral-
ity.
Id. at 121-23.
32. GuEST, supra note 17, at 1-6. Alfonsin also sent a bill to Congress, which Con-
gress passed, that nullified an amnesty law, the Law of National Pacification, that the
military had passed for itself before stepping down. See STATE CIMES, supra note 21, at
51-52. A National Appeals Court found the Law of National Pacification to be unconsti-
tutional and law nullifying it to be constitutional. Enrique Dahl & Alejandro Garro,
Introductory Note to Argentina National Appeals Court (Criminal Division)Judgment on Human
Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders, 26 I.L.M. 317, 319 (1987) (citing Fernandez
Marino, [1984] L.L. 521 (CApel. Penal 1984)).
33. David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin
American Southern Cone, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 105, 116 (1994).
34. Kathryn Lee Crawford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims: Argentina's Transi-
tion to Democracy, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 17, 20 n.15 (1990).
35. PARTIAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 31-39.
36. Decree No. 187/83, Dec. 15, 1983, [251] A.D.L.A. 17; see NUNCA MAs ARGEN-
TINA, supra note 1, at 428 (providing text of Decree No. 187/83).
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cidn de Personas7 ("CONADEP" or "S~ibato Commission"), the
Sfibato Commission was comprised of ten prominent Argentine
citizens. Chaired by the respected Argentine novelist Ernesto
Sibato, the mandate of the Sibato Commission was to collect
evidence of human rights violations committed by security
agents of the state.3 8 It would remain the task of the Argentine
courts to determine responsibility for such crimes and to try the
guilty parties.3 9
The Sibato Commission's mandate allowed it nine months
to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the disappear-
ances.40 CONADEP was empowered to collect information, but
it could neither subpoena witnesses nor compel testimony.4 It
nonetheless compiled over 50,000 pages of documentation from
interviews and eyewitness accounts. 42 It visited clandestine jails
and torture centers, establishing that the military had operated
over 340 of these centers during the Dirty War.4 3 The final re-
port of the Sibato Commission, entitled Nunca Mds, described
in great detail the organization of, and the methods employed
by, the Argentine military in carrying out the disappearances.4
It also chronicled the gruesome tortures that were reported in
almost every case referred to the Sfbato Commission.4' The re-
port ultimately was able to identify 8960 victims of disappear-
ances. 46 Additionally, it contained the names of over 1300 mili-
tary officers implicated in torture or disappearances during the
Dirty War.47 CONADEP delivered its findings to President Al-
fonsin in September 1984, and the report became a best-seller
37. NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at 428. Certain human rights groups
were critical of this type of commission, insisting that a congressional one would have
been better because it would have enjoyed subpoena powers that La Comisi6n Nacional
sobre la Desaparici6n de Personas ("CONADEP") did not. PARTIALJUSTICE, supra note 13,
at 16. Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquival refused his appointment to
CONADEP for this reason. Id.
38. PARTIALJusTicE, supra note 13, at 16.
39. Id.
40. SIMPSON & BENNET, supra note 14, at 399.
41. Emilio Mignone et al., Dictatorship on Tria: Prosecution of Human Rights Viola-
tions in Argentina, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 118, 126 n.29 (1984).
42. SIMPSON & BENNET, supra note 14, at 399.
43. Id.
44. NUNCA MAs ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at 9-284.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 10.
47. STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 54.
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when released as a book shortly thereafter. 4 A two hour synop-
sis of the S~ibato Commission's findings was shown subsequently
on national television as a documentary.49 President Alfonsin
chose not to disclose publicly the names of the officers impli-
cated by CONADEP, but the list was soon leaked to the press and
published in the weekly newspaper El Periodista.50
Even without the capacity to subpoena evidence or to prose-
cute, the Sdbato Commission performed the crucial function of
restoring collective memory to Argentina.51 In fulfilling its most
basic mandate, CONADEP "ascertain [ed] the truth of what had
happened."52 In so doing, it became a model for other truth
commissions that would follow, serving as an example of how a
newly restored civilian government might pursue truth and jus-
tice during a difficult transition period."
Attempts to prosecute members of the Argentine military
for human rights violations were to prove less successful. From
the outset, the military resisted such efforts fiercely,54 especially
when charges implicated officers still on active duty. 5 The
Alfonsin Government devised a strategy in which members of
the armed forces identified by CONADEP were classified accord-
ing to three different levels of culpability.56 Those deemed most
culpable were the three military juntas' leaders, who had created
the general policy of torture and disappearances. 57 The second
level of culpability included those commanding officers who had
ordered specific illegal acts.58 The third category was comprised
of those soldiers who, under orders, had committed the acts of
kidnapping, torture, or murder.59
Following the sentencing of those in the most culpable cate-
48. PARTJALjusncE, supra note 13, at 22.
49. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 615 (1994).
50. STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 54.
51. NUNCA MAS ARGENTINA, supra note 1, at 429.
52. Id. at 428.
53. See Hayner, supra note 49, at 614.
54. STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 55.
55. PARTLALJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 61.
56. See Graciela Fernandez Meijide et al., The Role of Historical Inquiry in Creating
Accountability for Human Rights Abuses, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD Lj. 269, 272-76 (1992)
(symposium remarks of Graciela Fernandez Meijide).





gory, military pressures on the Government mounted to curtail
further prosecutions. 0 The federal court that had sentenced
the junta members, however, had stipulated that no one who
had committed vicious or atrocious crimes was to be immune
from prosecution. 61 This decision necessarily implicated many
of the military in the second and third categories of culpability.
Faced with the prospect of even more extended prosecutions,
the armed forces responded with acts of military disobedience
and efforts to destabilize the civilian Government.6 2 Bowing to
such pressures, the Alfonsin Government, in December 1986,
passed the Punto Final Law,65 which established a sixty-day period
beyond which no new charges could be brought for state-spon-
sored crimes committed during the Dirty War.'
Meant to limit further prosecutions and appease the mili-
tary, the law failed on both counts. The Government had antici-
pated that new charges filed within the sixty-day period would
implicate no more than thirty or forty officers, most of whom
were retired.65 Instead, human rights groups worked frantically
during the two month interim, bringing charges against several
hundred military officers still on active duty, including more
than forty generals and eight admirals.66 At the end of the sixty-
day period, the human rights community was outraged that a
large number of officers responsible for some of the most egre-
gious crimes of the Dirty War were, at that point, placed beyond
the reach of the law.6 7
In addition, the Punta Final Law did not placate the military.
In fact, the prospect of wider prosecutions served only to precipi-
tate a military uprising in April 1987.68 The uprising was put
60. Id.
61. Id.; see Dahl & Garro, supra note 32, at 331-72 (providing English language
excerpts from case sentencing junta members).
62. Fernandez Meijide et al., supra note 56, at 275-76.
63. Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24, 1986, [1985-B] A.D.LA 1100; seeAlejandro M. Garro
& Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step For-
ward and Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283, 334-36 (1987) (describing text of
Law No. 23492, Punto Final Law).
64. Law No. 23.492, art. 1, [1986-B] A.D.L.A. 1100; see PARTIALJusTiCE, supra note
13, at 66. An exception was made for crimes involving the theft and irregular adoption
of the children of the disappeared. Law No. 23.492, art. 5, [1986-B] A.D.LA 1101.
65. PARTIAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 66.
66. Id. at 66-67.
67. Id. at 67,
68. See id. at 68-69. Two other military uprisings would follow, one in January 1988
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down, but the military ultimately received what it most wanted,
an end to the prosecutions of officers still on active duty.69 In
June 1987, the Alfonsin Government enacted the Due Obedi-
ence Law, 7° which established an irrebuttable presumption of in-
nocence for soldiers and officers up to the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel who had acted "in due obedience" to their superiors
during the Dirty War. 7' This sweeping measure effectively pre-
cluded all further prosecutions of officers except those who had
headed the three military juntas.72 Subsequent years would wit-
ness additional judicial regression. Carlos Menem, the Peronist
candidate who succeeded Alfonsin as President, ultimately
would issue sweeping pardons to all officers accused of human
rights abuses during the military dictatorship. 7  Ultimately, Ar-
gentina's efforts to secure truth were far more successful than its
efforts to realize justice.
B. Brazil
After Argentina, the next country in South America to con-
front the institutional crimes of its recent past was Brazil. While
Brazilian efforts to counter military impunity drew upon the Ar-
gentine experience, fundamental differences distinguished the
two countries.
The armed forces of Brazil ruled the country from April
1964 until March 1985.7' During that period, there were a suc-
cession of military administrations, each one headed by a four-
star general. 75 As in Argentina, the military period was one
and another in December 1988. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44
U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 123 (1989).
69. STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 56.
70. See Law No. 23.52 1,June 8, 1987, [1987-A] A.D.LA 260; Garro & Dahl, supra
note 63, at 337-39, 477 (discussing Law No. 23.521, Due Obedience Law).
71. Law No. 23.521, art. 1, (1987-A] A.D.LA 260; see Emmanuel Decaux, Interna-
tional Law and National Experiences, in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, JUSTICE
NOT IMPUNITY 27, 43 (1993) [hereinafter JusTIcE NOT IMPUNITY].
72. PARTIALJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 70.
73. Shirley Christian, Argentina Frees Ex-Junta Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at
A9; see Stotzky, supra note 68, 123-26 (providing critical assessment of President
Menem).
74. TORTURE IN BRAZIL: A REPORT BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAO PAULO ix (Joan
Dassin ed., Jaime Wright trans. 1986) (original in Portugese BRASIL: NUNCA MAIS)
[hereinafter NUNCA MAiS BRAZIL].
75. See generally THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA
175-80 (1989).
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marked by brutal repression, including widespread, systematic
torture76 and forced disappearances. 77 The justification for such
repression, as in Argentina, was the national security doctrine.78
The transition back to civilian rule was markedly different in Bra-
zil, however, in that it occurred in phases over a decade. 79 The
inauguration of General Ernesto Geisel in 1974 initiated the
redemocratization process with the period of distensdo, or relaxa-
tion.80 This was followed in 1979 by the period of abertura, the
opening, ushered in by the administration of General Jo~o Fi-
gueiredo.8 1
This gradual process of transition was characterized by a
consensus that there would be no prosecutions of the military
for human rights violations.8" Such a consensus was made ex-
plicit when Figueiredo passed an amnesty law as one of his first
acts in office.8 3 While the law offered the possibility of amnesty
to all persons accused of political crimes, it specifically prohib-
ited the investigation or prosecution of acts committed by state
agents between 1964 and 1979."4 First and foremost, then, it was
an attempt by the Brazilian military to legislate impunity.
The 1979 amnesty law ironically provided the opportunity
for the precise kind of truth-telling measure that it had been
designed to preclude. The law permitted lawyers access to the
records of the military courts to enable them to prepare amnesty
petitions for clients who were still imprisoned for political crimes
or who were living in exile. 85 Access to these records was re-
stricted. Lawyers were permitted to take out individual files only,
76. NUNCA MAIs BRAZIL, supra note 74, at 16-37, 180-203.
77. Id. at 204-16.
78. Id. at 60-67. In Brazil, this doctrine found official expression in the National
Security Law, promulgated in 1967 and revised several times thereafter. Id. at 66. Ulti-
mately, any kind of opposition to the military regime was criminalized. Id.
79. Numerous sources have analyzed the Brazilian transition to democracy. See,
e.g., GUILLERMO O'DoNNELL, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE (1986); THOMAS
E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITIcs OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL, 1964-85 (1988); ALFRED STEPAN,
DEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL (1989); STATE AND SOCIETY IN BRAZIL: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
(John D. Wirth et al., eds., 1987).
80. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 75, at 177-78; WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 14.
81. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 75, at 178; WESCHLER, sUpra note 2, at 14.
82. See Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 607.
83. See WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 14.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 16.
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and then for a twenty-four hour period only. 6 Even this limited
access, however, led to a remarkable discovery. The military
judges who had presided over the original trials of many of those
detained for political offenses often had allowed the detainees to
testify about the multiple tortures used to extract confessions
from them. 7 The sworn testimonies were entered into the court
annals, thereby becoming part of the Supreme Military Court's
official records. The implication of this discovery was not lost
upon the civilian attorneys who perused these records. As one
commentator subsequently noted, it was immediately recognized
that these records constituted:
[V] oluminous, conclusive proof from within the military gov-
ernment itself that torture was an essential part of the military
justice system in Brazil. The official proceedings of political
trials held in military courts indicate that the judicial authori-
ties were fully aware of the routine use of torture during pre-
liminary inquests, and that evidence produced under torture
was considered valid in the courtroom, even when defendants
revealed how their confessions had been extracted. They also
make clear that in general the necessity for torture during the
interrogation of political prisoners was submissively accepted
by the Brazilian courts.88
This discovery led to the formation of one of the most re-
markable truth-telling endeavors in recent history. Apprised of
such records, two Brazilian religious leaders who were long-time
human rights activists, Cardinal Arns of the Sio Paulo archdio-
cese, and Presbyterian minister Dr. Jaime Wright, resolved to sys-
tematically classify and document the incidence of torture under
the Brazilian military regime. 9
Because the military was still in power, the project necessar-
ily was conducted in total secrecy.9" As it developed, the effort
became as much a tribute to ecumenism as it was to the discre-
tion of its collaborators. Funded by the World Council of
Churches in Geneva, a Protestant organization, the project was
conducted in Brazil under the aegis of the Catholic Church and
86. Id.
87. Id. at 15-16.
88. NUNCA MAis BRzIL, supra note 74, at x.
89. See WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 9-40.
90. Id. at 17.
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the leadership of Cardinal Arns. 91 Proceeding with a team of
twelve lawyers, Arns and Wright began what was to prove a three
year endeavor of having the lawyers systematically check out case
files, one at a time, from the military archives.9 2 The files were
kept overnight, during which time they were copied surrepti-
tiously.9" The project began with three leased photocopying ma-
chines and a small staff working ten hours a day, seven days a
week, consumed with the laborious task of copying what would
ultimately amount to over a million pages of court documents.94
It was imperative to the continued secrecy of the project that
each and every file be returned after twenty-four hours in order
to fulfill the prescriptions of the amnesty law and not to arouse
the suspicions of the military.95
After three years, members of the self-appointed truth com-
mission suddenly realized that they had copied every file in the
military archives.96 Week by week, the copies had been hidden
in a secret warehouse in Sito Paulo, where each page was then
microfilmed.97 Over 500 reels of microfilm created in this man-
ner eventually were smuggled out of the country for safekeep-
ing." During this time, it had also been the task of one woman
to examine the one million pages of documentation and to col-
lect every sworn testimony of torture that had been admitted
into the court records.99 Computer specialists then processed
this data, classifying it according to types of torture and their
duration, the location of torture centers, and the names, ranks,
and any other information available regarding individual tortur-
ers.'00 In the final phase of the project, two newspaper journal-
ists were hired to prepare a written summary of the team's grim
91. Id. at 17-21. Arns undertook the project of his own initiative. Id. at 21. Cer-
tain that conservative sectors of the Church would derail such efforts if his participation
were brought to light, Arns could provide moral but not financial backing for the en-
deavor. Id. He proceeded without consulting the Vatican or even his fellow bishops in
Brazil. Id.
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id. at 16-18.
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 36.
98. Id. at 36-37.




In late 1984, Cardinal Arns met quietly with the director of
Vozes, the preeminent Catholic publishing company in Brazil. 10 2
Arns offered him the manuscript that had emerged as the fruit
of five years of secretive, high risk work.' The offer came ac-
companied by three stipulations: the publisher was to maintain
absolute secrecy regarding those who had. produced the book,
there was to be no publicity of the book prior to publication, and
there were to be no explanations following its publication. 04
Arns and his team also decided out of a sense of discretion to
withhold publication until a civilian government was re-inaugu-
rated in 1985.105
So it was that on July 15, 1985, Brasil. Nunca Mais appeared
in bookstores all over Brazil. 10 6 Citing the verbatim testimony of
1843 political prisoners, the book detailed over 283 types of tor-
ture that the military had employed and identified 242 torture
centers. 10 7 The book likewise documented a number of deaths
that had occurred under torture, 08 identified 125 individuals
who had been disappeared by the military regime,'0 9 and ascer-
tained that doctors had been present in the torture chambers. 10
Arns and his team waited another four months, until after the
first municipal elections conducted by the newly restored civilian
Government, to publish an additional list of 444 known tortur-
ers."' Alert to the possibility of retaliation by right-wing sectors,
the names of the investigatory team, with the exception of Arns
and Wright, were never revealed. 112
101. Id. at 55.
102. Id. at 68.
103. Id. at 68-69.
104. Id. at 69.
105. Id. at 69-70.
106. Id. at 71; see supra note 74 (introducing NUNCA MAIs BRAZIL).
107. NUNCA MAiS BRAZIL, supra note 74, at x.
108. See id. at 192-203.
109. Id. at 204-17. Counted among the disappeared was Jaime Wright's own
brother, Paulo, a community organizer and former congressman who was abducted by
the army in September 1973. Id. at 210.
110. Id. at 33-37.
111. Id. at xiii.
112. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 10. In order to avert any possibility that the Brazil-
ian military might attempt to confiscate or ban the book, Arns and his team allowed
word to leak out that the entire archives upon which the book was based had been




Unlike the report of the Sibato Commission in Argentina,
produced in a post-dictatorship period, Brasil. Nunca Mais was
produced from within the repressive machinery of the military
regime. What made the Brazilian effort even more remarkable
was the irrefutable nature of its documentation. It used only
those records created and verified by the military itself. That the
military maintained and preserved such records is itself amazing.
The reasons behind such self-incriminating record-keeping re-
main open to speculation, but are often attributed to the techno-
cratic spirit of the Brazilian armed forces.113 Whatever the rea-
sons for keeping such records, they comprised the basis and the
ultimate authentication for a report that would rank as the
number one best-selling book in Brazil for twenty-five weeks af-
ter its publication and would eventually go through twenty print-
ings." 4
Unlike their Argentine counterparts, the Brazilian Nunca
Mais team enjoyed no official mandate to pursue their truth-tell-
ing efforts. Neither did the Brazilian team aspire to produce evi-
dence that would one day be used in court against torturers. In
fact, the Brazilian team made explicit from the outset that its
purpose was not to produce evidence that might be used at a
"Brazilian Nuremburg trial."' 15 Instead, Cardinal Arns, Jaime
Wright, and their small but inspired team sought simply to re-
veal "to the conscience of the nation ... the dark reality of the
political repression that grew unchecked after 1964."116 Though
torturers had secured judicial amnesty by the 1979 law, the ef-
forts of Arns and his team served to deny a moral amnesty to the
perpetrators of such egregious human rights violations.
C. Uruguay
In Uruguay, a military junta ruled the country outright from
113. Jaime Wright has noted that the Brazilian generals "were intent on doing
things by the book, on following the forms, even if the results were often cruel and
perverse.... They never imagined they'd be held accountable to anyone." Id. at 15.
Another commentator has asserted that the Brazilian military "were like the Nazis....
They imagined that they were laying the groundwork for a civilization that would last a
thousand years - that, far from having to justify themselves for occasional lapses, they
would be celebrated by all posterity for the breadth of their achievement." Id. at 48.
114. Id. at 72.
115. NUNCA MAIs BRAZIL, supra note 74, at 8.
116. Id.
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1973 until 1985.117 The military takeover in Uruguay has been
termed a "slow coup," ' in that it actually was accomplished
through a progression of increasingly authoritarian measures by
the Government, beginning as early as 1967.119 It has also been
termed an "auto-coup," in that it finally occurred with the com-
plicity of the conservative President Juan Maria Bordaberry. 1 0
The twelve-year military dictatorship that ensued was unri-
valled in Latin America for the level of totalitarian control that it
exerted over civilian life. 2 ' Uruguay's population was small, a
mere three million people, half of whom lived in the capital
city. '2 These demographics readily facilitated the military's ef-
forts to restructure Uruguayan life at its very core.12 3 The re-
gime embarked upon a campaign to dismantle labor unions,
political parties, and university groups.124 Thirty thousand civil
servants were fired, and twenty-six news publications were sus-
pended or closed down. 125
117. AMERICAS WATCH, CHALLENGING IMPUNITY- THE LEY DE CADUCIDAD AND THE
REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN URUGUAY 7 (1989) [hereinafter CHALLENGING IMPUNITY].
During the years of dictatorship, power was wielded by ajunta of 24 officers, comprising
the High Command of the Armed Forces. Id. The military chose to maintain a figure-
head civilian president throughout these years, ostensibly to preclude the possibility
that any single officer might conspire to fill the office himself. Id.
118. Pion-Berlin, supra note 33, at 118.
119. One of President Jorge Pacheco Areco's first acts as President in 1967 had
been to outlaw a number of leftist groups and close two periodicals, El Sol and Epoca.
NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 6. A permanent state of emergency was imposed
in 1968. Id. at 7. In the subsequent administration ofJuan Maria Bordaberry, a "state
of internal war" was declared and all civil liberties were suspended. Id. The June 27,
1973 coup represented a culmination of this anti-democratic progression of events.
120. Juan Per6n as President of Argentina once noted that in Latin America, the
military never comes in uninvited. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 111. The case of Uru-
guay was illustrative; it was civilian President Bordaberry who in 1972 declared a state of
internal war, established a law of internal security, and gave the orders that the military
destroy the leftist Tupamaro guerrilla threat. Id. at 109.
121. Id. at 87.
122. Id. at 87-88.
123. The military decree that abolished Parliament on June 27, 1973 warned
against:
[T]he criminal action of the conspiracy against the country, burdened with
political groups without national feeling who have inserted themselves in the
very institutions ... under cover of a formally legal activity. Union organiza-
tions, the teaching profession in general and even the very powers of the state
endure that penetration and suffer that conspiracy.
NUNCA MAS URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 40.
124. Id.
125. CHALLENGING IMPUNITY, supra note 117, at 7.
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Efforts at social control eventually became Orwellian in na-
ture. The military authorities classified every Uruguayan accord-
ing to their imputed political trustworthiness, and such classifica-
tions were stamped upon the individual's files in the Govern-
ment's central archives.' 2 6  Even the private realm became
subject to arbitrary Government control. Joining sports clubs
and professional organizations came to require police ap-
proval, 12 7 and birthday parties could not be held without the
permission of a neighborhood precinct official.1 28
Uruguay won international notoriety as well, by acquiring
the highest per capita population of political prisoners of any
country in the world. 129  One Uruguayan later commented,
"[t]he whole country was run like a prison. The actual prisons
were merely the punishment cells."'3 0 Such punishment cells,
however, augured a gruesome reality for those incarcerated.
Military officials would later admit that everyone who was ar-
rested under the dictatorship was tortured.1
3
'
This torture, conducted by security officials, was both calcu-
lated and prolonged. One torturer explained this strategy to
one of his victims:
126. NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 42. Persons. placed in category A were
deemed politically trustworthy and were allowed employment in any public or private
capacity. Id. Those assigned to category B were regarded as ideologically questionable
and could work in the private but not the public sector. WESC0iLER, supra note 2, at 90-
91. The liberty of such citizens to travel was circumscribed, and they were subject to
frequent harassment by the security forces. Id. Those found to be subversive were rele-
gated to category C, where they were stripped of their rights and became virtual pari-
ahs. Id. at 91. They were banned from all public employment, and any private enter-
prise that might hire them would be subjected to Government audits. Id. Any past
affiliation with a leftist political party or expression of support for a labor union sufficed
to sentence one to this final category. NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 42.
127. NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 43.
128. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 92.
129. It is estimated that 600,000 Uruguayans were detained for political offenses
during the dictatorship. Pion-Berlin, supra note 33, at 111. This statistic is remarkable,
given how neighboring countries with much larger overall populations paled in com-
parison. In Chile there were an estimated 150,000 political prisoners and in Argentina
some 30,000. Id.
130. WESCHLER, Supra note 2, at 92.
131. NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 79. Later surveys would confirm that
torture under the military dictatorship was routine and that only in a handful of cases
were prisoners spared this ordeal. Id. at 78. Some 26 common methods of torture were
subsequently identified, many of which were inflicted simultaneously upon prisoners.
Id. at 86. These included beatings, long periods of being hooded, electric shock tor-
ture, rape and sexual violation, and submarining, forced immersion into a tank of water
mixed with urine or feces to the point of asphyxiation. Id. at 86-108.
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Don't you realize that here we have all the time in the world?
It is not like in Buenos Aires, where we were in a hurry to get
information. Here we safeguard your life; we interrogate to
the limit of your endurance; then we let you recuperate and
go at the interrogations again.' 32
The expertise of doctors was crucial to such a practice, and sev-
enty percent of former prisoners interviewed stated that they
had been aware of the presence of medical personnel at some
point during their torture sessions.' It has been noted that
there were significantly fewer forced disappearances, 164,134 in
Uruguay than in Brazil, Argentina, or Chile. The high incidence
of torture, the long-term prison sentences meted out to political
prisoners,13 5 and the fact that torture was routinely practiced un-
til the very end of the dictatorship, in 1985,136 imbued the Uru-
guayan military regime with a sui generis mode of brutality. The
regime, in the words of the renowned Uruguayan novelist
Eduardo Galeano, converted the country into. "a vast torture
chamber."' 3
7
Poor economic performance, international human rights
pressures, 38 and the example of neighboring authoritarian gov-
ernments ultimately forced the Uruguayan military in 1980 to
submit a revised constitution to a national plebiscite.'3 9 Despite
the severe restrictions it placed on opposition advertising, the
junta was unable to muster the support of the national electo-
rate."4 Stunned by a near sixty percent rejection of its proposed
constitution, the military was left to negotiate a transition back
to democracy.' 4 1 After a series of inconclusive meetings with
132. Id. at 179.
133. Id. at 236.
134. Id. at 214.
135. The average stay at the two major detention centers, Punta de Rieles and
Libertad, was 6.8 years. Pion-Berlin, supra note 33, at 111.
136. NUNCA MAS URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 81.
137. John King, Introduction to CARLOS MARTINEZ MORENO, EL INFIERNO ii (Readers
International trans., 1988).
138. The aggressive human rights policy of President Jimmy Carter's Administra-
tion in the United States was later seen as having been instrumental in this process. See
WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 149.
139. This attempt to win credibility for an authoritarian regime was likewise played
out in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil during this same time period. NUNcA MAs URUGUAY,
supra note 4, at 49.
140. Id. at 51-52.
141. Id. at 52.
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newly revived political parties, an agreement was finally struck in
August 1984 between the armed forces and representatives of
most of the major parties.14
Termed the "Navy Club Pact," the contents of this agree-
ment were never fully disclosed. 4  They ostensibly concerned
plans for national elections. It is widely speculated that the mili-
tary also obtained an implicit promise that there would be no
special investigations of their conduct during the dictatorship."4
Having concluded the pact, the military prepared to make a
clean departure from the Government, secure in the knowledge
that no further questions would be asked.145
In the presidential campaign that ensued, all four leading
candidates pledged to bring the human rights violators of the
dictatorship to justice.' 46 Colorado party candidate Julio Maria
Sanguinetti won the election, and set about to restore Uruguay's
hobbled democracy.' 47 Almost immediately, civil courts were
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id.
144. Servicio Paz yJusticia ("SERPAJ"), the nongovernmental organization that pre-
pared Nunca Mds Uruguay, declared:
It would be hard to assert that one outcome of the pact was an agreement not
to punish those in the military implicated in human rights violations. The
political parties taking part in the pact had no authority to negotiate on this
issue, nor could they know what an independent judiciary would decide on it
once democracy was restored. Nevertheless, military commanders did obtain
certain guarantees that made it almost impossible to carry out any investiga-
tion of their actions in the recent past.
Id. Other commentators remain more suspicious of what was transacted during this
meeting. Lawrence Weschler asserts thatJulio Maria Sanguinetti, the Colorado party
leader who subsequently was elected president, gave his assurances to the military that
the soon-to-be-restored executive branch would not initiate prosecutions of the military.
WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 167. Sanguinetti allegedly qualified this assurance, however,
with the stipulation that the executive branch would not block private citizens from
raising claims through traditional judicial channels. Id. Sanguinetti himself would
later insist:
The question of amnesty for the military was not discussed in the negotiations,
just as no one said that the jailed prisoners would be turned loose the day after
an elected government took office. It was an intelligent omission. We were
seeking ways to remove obstacles, not to create them. You can't make a peace
treaty discussing the origins of the war.
Id. at 166-67.
145. NUNCA MAs URUGUAY, supra note 4, at 57.
146. CHALLENGING IMPUNrrY, supra note 117, at 11.
147. The Sanguinetti administration reinstated the 1967 Constitution, restored
legal status to the trade unions and political parties that had been proscribed under the
military, and extended a pardon to all individuals facing trial by military courts. Id. at
12. Sanguinetti also secured passage of the Law of National Pacification, which freed
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flooded with cases alleging instances of torture and forced disap-
pearances by the military. 148 Such cases were stymied, however,
when General Hugo Medina, the Defense Minister, ordered of-
ficers who had been indicted to refuse to appear before the civil-
ian courts. 14
9
In December 1986, under mounting pressure from the mili-
tary, Sanguinetti introduced a sweeping measure known as la Ley
de Caducidad, which provided complete amnesty for all members
of the security forces who had committed human rights viola-
tions between 1962 and 1985.150 The law narrowly passed on De-
cember 22, 1986, amidst accusations, recriminations, and even
fistfights in the Uruguayan legislature. 5' The next day, which
was also the day that the first subpoena was to have been served
on a military officer, the legislature adjourned for the sum-
mer.112 A potential constitutional crisis was averted, but at the
price of having legislated impunity for torturers.
What followed was clearly not anticipated by either
Sanguinetti, the military, or the legislators. Political activities tra-
ditionally decelerate in Uruguay during the summer months of
December to February, and it can be surmised that Sanguinetti
hoped that the warm summer would dull the electorate's mem-
ory of the last-minute passage of this law.'53 Instead, an alliance
of families of the disappeared, former torture victims, and
human rights advocates banded together in late February
1987.'1 4 Determined to deny amnesty to perpetrators of human
rights violations, the alliance embarked upon a campaign to re-
peal la Ley de Caducidad.155
Such a campaign was unprecedented in the history of Uru-
the vast majority of those still imprisoned for political offenses, and which expressly
excluded from any amnesty all those who had committed human rights abuses under
the military regime. Id.
148. Id. at 13. Eventually, 180 police and military personnel were implicated for
human rights violations. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. The only exceptions to this broad measure were cases involving forced
disappearances or the abduction of children. JusTicE NoT IMPUNrr, supra note 71, at
46; see Law No. 15.848, Dec. 22, 1986, D.O. 879; see also CHALLENGINc IMPUNITY, supra
note 117, at 15-16 (providing text of la Ley de Caducidad).
151. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 171.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 175.
155. Id.
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guay, 56 although Uruguay's Constitution stipulated that a voting
drive mustering the signatures of twenty-five percent of the total
number of voters in the immediately prior election, in this in-
stance, approximately 550,000 signatures, would suffice to bring
a contested law up for a national referendum. 15 7 Facing the op-
position of Sanguinetti, the military, the major political parties,
and a deadline of December 22, 1987, the human rights coali-
tion began this herculean task. 5 Remarkably, support swelled
for the grassroots effort, and by October 1987 the coalition had
collected 520,000 signatures.5 9 In December, they submitted a
total of 634,702 signatures to the Electoral Court for authentica-
tion.16 ° Having predicted that four months would be required
to verify the votes, the court prolonged the verification process
for almost a full year.' 6 ' In the meantime, it disqualified
thousands of signatures, often on grounds of mere technicali-
ties.162 On November 28, 1988, the court announced that only
532,718 signatures were valid, leaving a deficit of approximately
23,000 signatures. 63 It declared, however, that roughly 36,000
signatures were "in suspension" and could qualify if such persons
confirmed their signatures at specially designated courts be-
tween December 17 and 19.t ' The human rights coalition fran-
tically sought to rally the required signatures a second time.1 65
Sanguinetti went so far as to denounce the renewed drive as a
"campaign of hate.' 66 As the terminal hour of 2:00 P.M. struck
on December 19, crowds of people waiting outside court offices
156. Id.
157. Id. at 175-76. This referendum provision had been based on a similar one in
the Swiss Constitution. Id. The Swiss provision, however, only required 50,000 signa-
tures, and this in a country with twice the population of Uruguay. Id. at 176.
158. CHALLENGING IMPUNITY, supra note 117, at 27.
159. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 178.
160. Id. at 179.
161. Id. at 221.
162. The signature of General Liber Seregni, leader of the opposition party Frente
Amplio, was disqualified because the "S" in his name was deemed not to match the "S"
he had first signed in the voter register 40 years previously. Id. at 219.
163. Id. at 221; see supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing number of
signatures required to force referendum).
164. WEScHLER, supra note 2, at 221-22.
165. The outcome of the signature drive came down to a matter of hours. Pro-
referendum radio stations updated the voting totals frequently, and even inquired over
the air about the whereabouts of particular voters whose signatures were still needed.
See id. at 225.
166. Id. at 222.
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forced their way through the doors before they could be locked
out.16 7 Such insistence paid off, as the voting drive accrued a
final tally of 23,166 votes, forcing a referendum. 168
Two and a half years later, the long-awaited referendum at
last came before the Uruguayan electorate. On April 16, 1989,
eighty percent of Uruguay's eligible voters-went to the polls, 69
with fifty-three percent of them voting to sustain the amnesty
law, and forty-one percent voting to overturn it.170 Since then,
there have been no serious attempts to revive the amnesty issue
politically. 17 A little publicized congressional commission ascer-
tained that there were 164 disappearances under the military re-
gime, but the commission was not given a mandate to investigate
torture or illegal detentions. 172 In 1989, a non-governmental or-
ganization, Servicio de Paz y Justicia ("SERPAJ") published Ura-
guay Nunca Mds, a more comprehensive survey of human rights
violations during the dictatorship. 173 To date, however, there
has been no officially authorized effort by the Uruguayan Gov-
ernment to establish the full truth of what occurred in the coun-
try between 1973 and 1985.174
While the referendum upheld the amnesty law, thereby pre-
cluding prosecutions of human rights violators, one judicial card
remained to be played. In the months following the referen-
dum, lawyers from the Uruguayan non-governmental organiza-
tion Instituto de Estudios Legales y Sociales de Uruguay ("IELSUR"),
in conjunction with Americas Watch, filed eight cases before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 17 5 The suits
were based not on direct human rights violations suffered under
the military regime, but rather on the effects of la Ley de
167. Id. at 226.
168. Id. at 227.
169. Id. at 233.
170. Id.
171. JusrIcE NOT IMPUNITY, supra note 71, at 46.
172. See Hayner, supra note 49, at 616. Hayner notes that the commission was so
little publicized, inside or outside the country, Ohat many commentators do not even
realize that Uruguay had such a group. Id.
173. See Weschler, supra note 3, at xxiv.
174. Ironically, the cases of Uruguayan citizens who disappeared or who were vic-
timized in Argentina were more fully investigated and better documented, through the
efforts of the Argentine Sibato Commission, than cases involving Uruguayan citizens
within Uruguay. WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 130.
175. Weschler, supra note 3, at xxv.
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Caducidad itself' 6 The petitioners alleged that the law as ap-
plied violated their rights to judicial recourse and judicial rem-
edy. 177 Almost four years later, the Inter-American Commission
found for the petitioners, declaring that the effects of the am-
nesty law violated international human rights treaty obligations
that Uruguay was bound to honor. 17 While the Inter-American
Commission's findings did not require that Uruguay repeal la
Ley de Caducidad, it did establish, as precedent for the future, the
obligation of signatory states to investigate and prosecute claims
of egregious human rights violations.' 79
D. Chile
Chile is the most recent country in the Southern Cone to
confront the question of how to deal with former torturers. The
military dictatorship in Chile was one of the continent's longest,
extending from 1973 until 1990.180 During those seventeen
years, a military junta under the command of General Augusto
Pinochet ruled Chile, and human rights violations were both sys-
tematic and widespread.'
The coup in Chile on September 11, 1973 met with little to
no armed resistance, and within days the armed forces exercised
effective control over the entire country.18 2 The military never-
theless embarked upon a campaign of terror meant to intimi-
date the populace, as well as to eliminate physically supporters of
176. Id. at xxvi.
177. Id.
178. The Inter-American Commission found that la Ley de Caducidad violated the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, in particular: Article 18, the
right to justice; Article 1, the duty of state parties to respect and ensure rights; and
Article 8, the right to a judicial remedy. Id. The Inter-American Commission also
found the law violated Article 25, the right to judicial protection, of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. Id.
179. Id. The Inter-American Commission's decision also serves as legal precedent
for human rights groups to oppose similar amnesty measures in the future. Id.
180. See generally Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule
of Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULsAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 253 (1995); see also Weissbrodt &
Fraser, supra note 20, at 601.
181. Snyder, supra note 180, at 258-64. Gross human rights violations included
arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and the systematic use of torture by secur-
ity forces. Id.
182. REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIA-
TION 129 (Phillip E. Berryman trans., Introduction byJos6 Zalaquett, 1993) [hereinafter
CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION].
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Salvador Allende's deposed socialist Government. 1 3  Wide-
spread arrests followed, and more than 7000 prisoners were de-
tained in the National Stadium in Santiago alone. 1 4 The tor-
ture of prisoners during interrogation became common practice
at this time,8 5 and the first weeks of the coup witnessed the in-
discriminate killing of civilians by the military.18 6
The early weeks of the military regime also signaled the be-
ginning of a calculated practice that would characterize the first
four years of the dictatorship, the forced disappearance and
murder of selected individuals deemed to be ideologically sus-
pect.18 7 While the initial bloodletting of the coup subsided after
December 1973, such disappearances continued through 1977,
primarily at the hands of the military intelligence service known
as Direccion de Inteligencia Nacional ("DINA").188
A different phase of the repression began in 1977, when
DINA was dissolved after its role in the assassination of Orlando
Letelier in Washington, D.C. had been revealed. 89 The military
intelligence branch was reorganized under the title of the Centro
Nacional de Informaciones ("CNI"). g° The CNI spearheaded the
regime's repressive activities until the transition to democracy in
1990.91 Although fewer disappearances occurred during this
183. Id. at 136-43. Salvador Allende's "peaceful way" or "Chilean way" to socialism
has been much analyzed and discussed. See, e.g., BRIAN LOvEmAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY
OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM (1979); PAUL SIGMUND, THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE AND THE
PoLrTcs OF CHILE, 1964-1976 (1977); ARTURO VALENZUELA, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMO-
CRATIC REGIMES: CHILE (1978).
184. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at 151.
185. Id. at 150.
186. Id. at 148.
187. Approximately 1000 victims were ultimately ascertained to have disappeared
in this fashion, most of them in the first months after the coup. Id. at xxv.
188. Direccion de Inteligencia Nacional ("DINA") was established formally in 1974
under the leadership of Army General Manuel Contreras Sepulveda. The organization
became the instrument through which the regime systematically practiced its policy of
forced disappearances between 1974 and 1978. AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE "POLITICS OF AGREEMENT" 45 (1991) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH].
189. Id.; see 3 EUGENIO AHUMADA ET AL., CHILE: LA MEMORIA PROHIBIDA 9-47
(1989). The dissolution of the DINA after the revelations regarding the Letelier assassi-
nation is also recounted in JOHN DINGES & SAUL LANDAU, ASSASSINATION ON EMBASSY
Row (1980). See aisoJudith Hippler Bello et al., Prosecution of Officials of Secret Service for
Assassination of Former Ambassador to United States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 290 (1996) (summa-
rizing Letelier case history).
190. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at xxv. Centro Naciona/ de
Informaciones ("CNI") replaced DINA when it was dissolved in 1977. Id.
191. Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 617.
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later period, torture and assassinations continued. 192
Throughout the years of dictatorship in Chile, a network of
Chilean human rights organizations emerged despite the intimi-
dation and repression of the military. Foremost among these
was the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity, based out of
the Catholic cathedral in Santiago."'3 Originally founded in
conjunction with a number of other churches, the organization
that evolved into the Vicariate offered direct assistance to victims
of human rights abuses and their families and also compiled a
vast set of archives documenting human rights violations under
the military. 19
4
In 1988 a plebiscite was convened, ironically, by the terms of
Pinochet's own 1980 constitution.' 95 The plebiscite was sched-
uled to determine whether Pinochet would continue as head of
state until 1997.196 So confident was Pinochet of his own popu-
lar approval that he allowed strict electoral processing and the
presence of hundreds of foreign observers.197 On October 5,
1988 the Chilean population, voting in the first undeniably free
election in fifteen years, delivered a resounding defeat to Pi-
nochet's final quest for electoral legitimacy. 98 Fifteen months
192. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at xxv.
193. The Vicariate, or La Vcaria de la Solidaridad, began as an ecumenical effort at
the time of the coup to assist victims of Government repression, particularly the families
of the disappeared. Known first as the Committee for the Peace, it was reorganized in
1976 by Cardinal Raill Silva under the explicit auspices of the Catholic Church. See
PAMELA LOWDEN, MORAL OPPOSITION TO AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHILE, 1973-90, (1996)
(analyzing history and political function of Vicariate); see also AMERICAS WATCH, THE
VICARIA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD (1987) (detailing profile and history of Vicariate's founding
and its human rights activities).
194. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at xxvii. It has been observed
that Cardinal Silva's formal establishment of the Vicariate marked the first time that
human rights work and advocacy became recognized as a sacramental ministry of the
Catholic Church.
195. SAMUEL CHAVKIN, STORM OVER CHILE: THEJUNTA UNDER SIEGE 282-83 (2d ed.
1989).
196. Id. at 279.
197. Id. at 282. The junta's confidence, however, admitted to certain limits. Op-
position advertising was limited to fifteen minutes a day on television for the two weeks
preceding the plebiscite. Id. at 279. The pro-Government lobby, in contrast, was given
access for more than a year to hours a day of television and radio time on government-
controlled stations. Id. at 280.
198. Nearly 55% of the electorate voted against Pinochet, while 43% voted in his
favor. Id. at 281. Despite the defeat, Pinochet vowed to stay on as Commander-in-Chief
of the army, per the provisions of the 1980.Constitution. See Timothy Scully & Alejan-
dro Ferreiro, Chile Recovers Its Democratic Past: Democratization by Installment, 18 NOTRE
DAMEJ. LECIS. 318-22 (1992).
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later, Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democrat party was elected
President, and his inauguration on March 11, 1990 signalled
Chile's return to civilian government.
Aylwin's administration, while enjoying a strong electoral
mandate, was limited by the constraints of the 1980 Constitution,
by Pinochet's ongoing presence as commander-in-chief of the
Army, and by the fact that Chile's military exited from power
united and undefeated.' 99 Notwithstanding such constraints,
one of Aylwin's first decisions as President was to establish the
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation ("National
Commission"), with the charge that the National Commission
"clarify in a comprehensive manner the truth about the most se-
rious human rights violations" suffered during the military dicta-
torship.200 Aylwin's charge was one that from the outset admit-
ted to limitations. He very explicitly noted that the goal of the
National Commission was justicia en lo posible, translated as 'Jus-
tice inasmuch as was possible."2 1
Eight persons comprised the National Commission. They
were chosen from across the Chilean political spectrum, with no
apparent political bias. 2  Heading the National Commission
was Rafil Rettig, a distinguished senior member of the Radical
Party who had served as Ambassador to Brazil under Allende.2 °3
The mandate of the National Commission was threefold. It
was to clarify how the repressive system had worked, account for
every person reported dead or disappeared, and propose meas-
199. When confronted with the possibility of prosecutions of the military for
human rights violations, Pinochet vehemently declared, "[nbo-one is going to touch my
people. The day they do, the rule of law will come to an end." AMERICAS WATCH, supra
note 188, at 48. The legal limits the outgoing authoritarian regime imposed upon the
civilian Government have been described as "tutelary powers." See Scully & Ferreiro,
supra note 198, at 317 (detailing limitations imposed on civilian Government).
200. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at 5-9 (reprinting Supreme
Decree No. 355, promulgated April 25, 1990).
201. AMEuCAS WATCH, supra note 188, at 5; seeJorge S. Correa, Dealing With Past
Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dictatorship, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455
(1992).
202. See Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 603. Such balance won immediate
credibility for the National Commission. That there were an even number of members
was seen as a further good faith measure on the part of the Aylwin Government that no
attempts were being made to guarantee a majority vote in case of divided opinions.
Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1425, 1433 (1992).
203. Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 604.
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ures for reparation and prevention. °4 Implicit in this mandate
were a series of significant limitations. First, there was the con-
straint of time. The National Commission was allowed only nine
months to complete its tasks. °5 Second, the scope of violations
to be investigated was closely curtailed. While types of torture
employed by state agents were to be catalogued, only those cases
ending in death were to be investigated. 0 6 Finally, the National
Commission was not given subpoena powers. As an organ of the
executive branch, it could not conduct trials.2 7
Despite such limitations, the National Commission com-
piled a massive, 1800 page report that remarkably won the en-
dorsement of each of the eight commissioners. 8 Such unanim-
ity marked a significant political victory for the Aylwin Adminis-
tration and did much to ensure the wider credibility of the
National Commission's findings.2 9 Presented to President
Aylwin in February 1991, the report identified 2025 victims who
died as the result of human rights violations by the state and
ninety victims killed by opposition groups.2 10 The National
Commission did not publicly name those responsible for human
rights violations, but sent all incriminating evidence that it gath-
ered to the courts.2  While the Chilean military would contest
the National Commission's finding that no state of internal war
212 oexisted in 1973, none of the National Commission's conclu-
sions regarding individual victims were refuted.1 In the words
of one of the Commissioners, "[a]cross the political spectrum,
those findings were explicitly recognized as the truth."21 4
II. A COMPARISON
Each of the South American countries surveyed in this anal-
204. Zalaquett, supra note 202, at 1433-34.
205. Id. at 1434.
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Decree No.
355).
207. Zalaquett, supra note 202, at 1435.
208. Id.
209. Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 604.
210. Zalaquett, supra note 202, at 1434.
211. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at xxxii. CommissionerJos6
Zalaquett defended this course of action, asserting that to have publicly named people
would have been the equivalent of convicting them without due process of law. Id.
212. Weissbrodt & Fraser, supra note 20, at 617 n.76.
213. Zalaquett, supra note 202, at 1435.
214. Id.
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ysis dealt with accountability for former torturers in a different
manner.2 15 Uruguay pursued neither trials nor official truth-tell-
ing measures, and never revealed the names of torturers. In Bra-
zil, there were likewise no trials or official efforts to establish the
truth, but officially sanctioned government records were utilized
to morally indict those responsible for egregious human rights
violations. Moreover, a list of torturers was later disclosed in the
Brazilian press. In Chile, there was an officially sanctioned effort
to establish the truth regarding human rights violations resulting
in death, but there were few prosecutions and no public identifi-
cation of individuals responsible for such violations. In Argen-
tina, efforts to restore democracy included an official truth com-
mission, prosecution of high-ranking military officials, and the
public, albeit unofficial, disclosure of the names of individuals
who had engaged in torture.
How are such divergent efforts to be assessed? A standard
of pure retributive justice might require that every human rights
violation be prosecuted to the fullest extent possible.216 Such a
position, however, could only be maintained consistently in an
ideal world.217 In a world that instead finds reinstituted democ-
racies precariously fragile, such a mandate may be decidedly un-
realistic and even ill-fated for countries in transition.2 18  A stan-
dard of pure consequentialist justice, conversely, would be con-
215. See Pion-Berlin, supra note 33 (analyzing different approaches for dealing
with former torturers in newly democratic governments).
216. Jaime Malamud-Goti, one of Rafil Alfonsin's legal advisers in Argentina, notes
that the retributivist philosophy of punishment is based on the notion of just desert,
one must pay the consequences for one's actions. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals? 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 6 (1990).
217. Malamud-Goti espouses a modified retributivist philosophy, asserting that
transitional governments, in order to consolidate democracy and protect human rights,
have a moral obligation, at the very least, to initiate trials against the highest ranking
officers responsible for violations. Id. at 13-14. He notes, however, that there is no such
obligation to punish every officer who has transgressed the law. Id. at 14. Widespread
prosecutions, he acknowledges, may actually diminish the people's trust in democratic
institutions and imperil a transition to democracy by provoking a backlash by the mili-
tary. Id. Because Malamud-Goti insists that any strategy to prosecute human rights
violations must consider consequences, his position is not one of pure retributivism.
218. Carlos Nino, another legal adviser to President Alfonsin, flatly rejected the
theory of mandatory retribution and its demand that punishment be meted out for
every crime committed. Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish past Abuses of Human Rights Put
Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2620 (1991). Any prosecutions,
Nino insisted, must be counterbalanced by the need to preserve the democratic system.
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cerned merely with gauging the larger social advantages or
disadvantages of prosecuting human rights violators.2 19 A conse-
quentialist approach is essentially utilitarian, asking simply
whether a society as a whole would benefit from efforts to hold
torturers accountable for their misdeeds. Individual rights, par-
ticularly rights of due process and reparation for victims, could
well be dismissed in such an assessment. Sanguinetti justified his
refusal to prosecute or even investigate human rights violations
in Uruguay on grounds of almost pure consequentialism.22 °
One commentator has ventured, "Sanguinetti perceived that the
pursuit of justice would yield doubtful rewards that were simply
not worth the imagined costs."
22 1
Ultimately, a theory of justice based on deterrence and rep-
aration to victims may prove more feasible given the constraints
of realpolitik in countries returning to civilian control. While still
acknowledging the rights of victims, such a theory nonetheless
makes allowances for the fragility of restored democracies and
the many limitations under which they function.222 The judicial
philosophy underlying this type of approach has been termed
"an ethic of responsibility" and holds that politicians must be
guided by ethical insights but must always consider the predict-
able consequences of their actions.223
In none of the above-mentioned countries was there an
ideal solution. Realistically, there was never a possibility of one.
It simply was not feasible to bring every perpetrator to justice or
219. Malamud-Goti, supra note 216, at 14.
220. Sanguinetti declared, "[i]f the French were still thinking about the Night of
St. Bartholomew, they'd be slaughtering each other to this day. This is a political, and
not a moral, decision. It has to be resolved politically because it's a political con-
flict . . . ." WESCHLER, supra note 2, at 191.
221. Pion-Berlin, supra note 33, at 129.
222. Jos6 Zalaquett, considered to be the architect of the Chilean National Com-
mission, has written that deterrence and reparation comprise the two fundamental
objectives of any policy meant to deal with past human rights violations. STATE CRIMES,
supra note 21, at 29. Zalaquett further asserts that other objectives, such as retribution
and revenge, can never be considered legitimate. Id.
223. Jos6 Zalaquett has articulated this theory, which could be said to characterize
the approach chosen by the Chilean truth commission. Zalaquett, supra note 202, at
1429. The theory is based upon Max Weber's distinction between an ethic of responsi-
bility and an ethic of conviction. Id. (citing FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY,
Politics as Vocation, 77, 120-22 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946)). An
ethic of conviction, states Weber, entails acting regardless of the outcome. Id. In con-
trast, an ethic of responsibility considers the predictable consequences of one's actions,
though it does not imply a lack of conviction. Id.
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to satisfy the expectations of every individual or family that had
been victimized. It was perhaps inevitable that the human rights
constituencies in each of these countries were to remain dissatis-
fied with the solutions adopted.2 2 4 It may even be argued that
the ultimate efficacy of each solution can only be assessed histor-
ically, in terms of whether such authoritarian regimes are pre-
cluded from ever again seizing power in the future. The title
that many of the truth commissions chose to announce their
findings alludes to such an awareness: Nunca Mds, Never Again.
III. AN ASSESSMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
SACRAMENTALJTY
An assessment of post-torture regime strategies based upon
the Catholic notion of sacramentality begins neither with the un-
yielding maxims of pure retributivism, nor with the sole focus
upon results that characterizes consequentialism. The principle
of sacramentality is not a judicial one and does not purport to
articulate a philosophical theory of punishment. It instead is
concerned with a fundamentally different question: how can the
truth be. known? Unlike the theory of retributivism, a sacramen-
tal analysis posits no requirement that punishment be meted out
for offenses." 5 Unlike consequentialism, it purports to make no
judgments about whether or when individual rights must be
trumped by the collective needs of a society. A sacramental ap-
proach would even insist that this latter endeavor comprises a
false dichotomy, in that the endeavor to ascertain the truth ulti-
mately vindicates both social and individual rights.
The Catholic concept of sacramentality has traditionally
224. Victims and their families were not only left dissatisfied but their impact on
government policymaking ultimately was deemed to be minimal. See Pion-Berlin, supra
note 33, at 126 (stating "[t]he human rights lobbies of the Southern Cone had a negli-
gible impact on government policy. Their pleas for the wholesale punishment of those
involved in acts of state terror went unanswered.").
225. Luis Perez Aguirre, ajesuit priest who himself is a survivor of torture and the
founder of SERPAJ notes:
State-sponsored terrorism, acts of genocide, and so on, shows that the guilty
have only rarely been tried-in many cases only to receive negligible sentences
compared to the gravity and magnitude of their crimes. But the "real judg-
ment" has always been a moral one, and it has endured as a heritage of peo-
ples and of history.
Luis Perez Aguirre, The Consequences of Impunity in Society, in JuSTICE NOT IMPUNITY,
supra note 71, at 107, 110.
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been the belief that the visible, material elements of the world
can in fact reveal what would otherwise be the invisible divine
presence. 2 6 Central to the Catholic Eucharist is the notion that
elements such as bread and wine can embody the fullness of the
divine. This belief is confined neither to the Eucharist, nor sim-
ply to material objects. The entire range of human existence is
seen, in the Catholic vision of the world, as being revelatory of
God.2 2 7
This sacramental sense of reality, sometimes termed "sacra-
mental sensibility," is deemed to be more than simple possibility
in the Catholic vision. The Catholic tradition rather insists that
such a world view is absolutely necessary. Lacking it, humans
would have no tangible experience of the invisible God. 28 In a
Catholic notion of metaphysics, then, it is of paramount impor-
tance that grace that is otherwise invisible become concrete and
accessible.
Such a theological premise bears direct implications for
countries negotiating the transition from torture regimes to
reinstituted democracies. By way of legal analogy, if democracy
is to connote anything beyond an aspirational norm for civil soci-
ety, it must embody something of palpable substance. In the
226. Theologian Richard McBrien writes:
No theological principle or focus is more characteristic of Catholicism or
more central to its identity than the principle of sacramentality. The Catholic
vision sees God in and through all things: other people, communities, move-
ments, events, places, objects, the world at large, the whole cosmos. The visi-
ble, the tangible, the finite, the historical-all these are actual or potential
carriers of the divine presence.
RICHARD McBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 1180 (1980). It was Augustine who first developed a
theory of sacraments, in the framework of Neoplatonic Christian philosophy. HERBERT
VORGRIMLER, SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY 45 (1992). Augustine defined sacraments as "visi-
ble signs that represent an invisible reality" (invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma). Id. Hugh
of St. Victor later defined sacrament as "a bodily or material element that is used to
make present an invisible or spiritual grace." Id.
227. Writings on the Catholic notions of sacrament and sacramentality are exten-
sive. See, e.g., KARL RAHNER, 6 SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 378 (1970); A WORLD OF GRACE
(Leo J. O'Donovan ed., 1980); ALEXANDRE GANoCzY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC
SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY (1979); BERNARD COOKE, SACRAMENTS AND SACRAMENTALITY
(1983); LEONARDO BOFF, SACRAMENTS OF LIFE, LIFE OF THE SACRAMENTS (1987); see also
JOSEPH MARTOS, DOORS TO THE SACRED (1981) (providing excellent historical survey of
sacraments' development in Catholic tradition).
228. Referring to the elements of the world and of human experience that convey
the divine presence, McBrien asserts, "[i]ndeed, it is only in and through these mate-
rial realities that we can even encounter the invisible God." MCBRIEN, supra note 226, at
1180.
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context of reinstituted democracies, such substance lies precisely
in a nation's need to know fully and irrefutably what occurred
during the years of a torture regime.
This need for truth is at once a need for the revelatory di-
mension of sacramentality; that which was shrouded in secrecy
and. terror must be made concrete and rendered part of a coun-
try's collective memory. Even when there is a general awareness
that torture has occurred, as there inevitably is, there remains
the task of imbuing such awareness with official recognition. 2 9
The failure to do so further perpetuates the suffering of victims
of human rights violations.23 0 Legally, it may deny families of
the disappeared the closure of at least having missing loved ones
declared dead, and it may preclude claims for reparations by liv-
ing survivors of human rights abuses. Often, the need for an
official recognition of the truth is more acutely felt by victims
and their families than the need for justice.23 '
The need to establish the truth implicates more than ques-
tions of reparation for individual victims of human rights abuses.
It concerns societies as a whole, particularly societies that have
endured torture regimes. A sacramental imperative that the
truth be officially established is never more exigent than in cases
where an authoritarian regime has foisted its own aberrant ver-
sion of history upon an entire country.23 2 Reflecting on the task
229. Professor Thomas Nagel made this point at the 1988 Aspen Institute Confer-
ence. Explaining why knowledge must be official, Nagel ventured, "[i ] t's the difference
between knowledge and acknowledgment. It's what happens and can only happen to
knowledge when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public
cognitive scene." STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 93.
230. Richard Goldstone, Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Balkan States and Rwanda, has emphasized that the most important lesson learned
by truth commissions has been the deep need of victims for acknowledgment. Richard
Goldstone, Exposing Human Rights Abuses-A Help or a Hindrance to Reconciliation?, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 607, 615 (1995). Goldstone notes, "[florgiveness cannot be
granted without knowledge; and without forgiveness, there cannot be any meaningful
reconciliation." Id.
231. Jos6 Zalaquett has observed that the families of the Chilean disappeared often
emphasized that what mattered most to them was that the truth be revealed and that
the memory of their loved ones not be vilified or forgotten. Zalaquett, supra note 202,
at 1437. The same has been observed regarding torture victims. Another commentator
declares, "[i]f anything, the desire for truth is often more urgently felt by the victims of
torture than the desire forjustice. People don't necessarily insist that former torturers
go to jail-there's been enough ofjail-but they do want to see the truth established."
STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 93.
232. Zalaquett noted the consequences of denials by the military regime that there
was any practice of forced disappearances in Chile:
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facing Uruguay after the military dictatorship, the writers of Uru-
guay Nunca Mds observed:
[F]irst we had to learn the magnitude of the catastrophe...
[of] the period from 1972 to 1985, when Uruguayan society
was continually subjected to lies, isolation, silence, and fear.
Only with difficulty did we come to realize how deeply the
dictatorship had affected the whole body of society, what it
meant to have spent years living as collective encapuchados, as
if with the torturer's hood over our heads, in silence. We pre-
tended to be ignorant, a strategy some found necessary for
survival, for salvaging the salvageable. . . Because
'Uruguayans never fully understood what was happening, it
has been easy to minimize and lie about the crimes that were
committed.23 3
Any transition to democracy gauged from a sacramental
perspective would be assessed according to one primary crite-
rion: how fully has the truth officially been made known? By
these terms, Uruguay would be the most deficient country of
those surveyed in this analysis. While the Uruguayan Govern-
ment has acknowledged that a limited number of disappear-
ances occurred during the dictatorship, it has refused to either
investigate or document the far more extensive incidents of tor-
ture and illegal imprisonment.234 Chile has investigated and ac-
knowledged incidents of political violence resulting in death,
but the stories of countless torture victims who survived have not
yet become a part of the country's collective memory in a full or
official way. Brazil and Argentina, despite political limitations,
have managed to document both torture and disappearances;
Argentina, through an officially mandated commission, and Bra-
zil, through the publication of Government verified documents.
A sacramental mandate to establish the truth does not pro-
ceed apart from the judicial realm. Often, it is only the judicial
These denials were largely believed by most of [the military regime's] civilian
supporters (many of them probably preferred not to know for sure). They
would accept the official explanations that nothing more than isolated, inevi-
table excesses could have occurred. At most they would believe that the real
extent of the abuses was far less than what was reported by domestic and inter-
national human rights organizations and by the foreign press.
CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 182, at xxv.
233. Weschler, supra note 3, at vii-viii.
234. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing lack of mandate for
National Commission to investigate torture and illegal detentions).
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process, with the power to subpoena information, and with due
process rights guaranteed for the accused, that ensures that the
full measure of the truth will be ascertained. 5 Moreover, the
obligation of establishing the truth has, in recent years, become
a norm stipulated by. international law.1
3 1
Ultimately the sacramental imperative of establishing the
truth, however, is a matter that transcends the judicial process.23 7
An even more compelling need than a legal one ultimately de-
mands truth-telling measures. In the absence of such efforts, the
collective memory of a nation is inherently flawed. The writers
of Uruguay Nunca Mds seized upon this insight when they as-
serted:
Unless we commit ourselves to revealing the truth, to seeing
that justice is carried out, and demonstrate that acting with
impunity no longer has a place on our national scene, our
Uruguay will be committing political suicide .... Allowing
acts to have been performed with impunity keeps us from re-
covering essential things that were lost in the dark years ....
[Y]ou need a social and political geography, a known history:
you need to know what happened and why, what went on in a
historical period, how events were resisted or submitted to,
how rights were abused, how passage out of a dark period was
achieved, and how the future will be. To rescue that history
... is to look without shame at the future. 3 s
The task confronting nations in a transition back to democracy
235. STATE CRIMES, supra note 21, at 93.
236. The mandate to establish the truth would arise out of customary international
law, as well as from the obligations that nations incur in becoming parties to interna-
tional human rights treaties. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991). States party
to comprehensive human rights conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights, assume an
obligation to at least investigate serious violations of physical integrity, namely torture,
extra-legal executions, and disappearances. Id. at 2568. States party to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention
Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
assume a further obligation to prosecute such offenses. Id. at 2562-65.
237. Recent scholarship has even suggested that legal measures and criminal pros-
ecutions may have only a minimal capacity.for informing the collective memory of a
country regarding the human rights violations of a previous military regime. See MarkJ.
Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463
(1995).
238. Weschler, supra note 3, at x-xi.
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is precisely that of "rescuing history." If this is to be done, the
stories of a former regime's torture victims must be acknowl-
edged publicly and become a part of the larger collective mem-
ory of their country. The best hope for such victims and their
respective societies may well be a biblical one: "You shall learn
the truth and the truth will set you free."
2 3 9
239. John 8:32.
